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Abstract
Labor market imperfections are commonly believed to be a major reason for
imposing trade impediments. In this paper, I introduce labor market rigidities that
are prevalent in continental European countries into the well-known protection for
sale model proposed by Grossman and Helpman (1994). I show that contrary to
commonly held views, imperfections in the labor market do not necessarily increase equilibrium trade protection. A testable equilibrium trade protection equation is also derived. The findings in this paper are hence particularly relevant
for empirical tests of trade policy determinants in economies with more regulated
labor markets.
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1. Introduction
There are many reasons to believe that employment considerations are a major determinant of trade protection. The conventional wisdom is that labor market imperfections will
increase the level of trade protection. Trade union influence, for instance, is usually believed
to lead to higher import barriers. Since trade protection allows unions to demand higher
wages and/or employment guarantees, unions are likely to favor the imposition of trade barriers. Not surprisingly then, U.S. trade unions led a determined public campaign against
the ratification of NAFTA, and union contributions to U.S. congressmen were positively
correlated with the likelihood that these representatives voted against trade liberalization.1
Moreover, firms may also become less flexible in adapting to increased import competition
when facing binding collective bargaining agreements, so they may lobby for compensating
trade protection. Inflexible wages, caused by trade union activity or by effective minimum
wages, can cause unemployment when import competition increases, and generous unemployment benefits can undermine the willingness of workers to accept new jobs. If wages
cannot adjust downward, then import barriers may be welfare-enhancing, so higher trade
protection may result even without assuming any lobbying influence. Not surprisingly, high
unemployment rates, low employment growth rates, and high shares of unskilled labor have
been found to go hand in hand with higher trade protection (Rodrik 1995). The earlier empirical literature on the political economy of trade protection has essentially concluded that
labor market considerations are a major determinant of trade protection, and this seems in
accordance with common perception.
This paper examines the question of whether and how labor market frictions influence
trade policy in the light of new theoretical advances in the trade protection literature. Thus
far, it seems that the new political economy of trade protection literature has downplayed
the influence of labor market imperfections on trade protection. For instance, consider the
preeminent model in the political economy of trade protection literature, the protection
for sale model of Grossman and Helpman (1994)2. The GH model derives a higher weight
for the welfare of lobby groups in the governmental objective function in a principal-agent
framework where lobbies offer the government contributions in exchange for trade policy.
In the GH model, labor is the only mobile factor and earns a competitive wage which is
independent of any protection influences. Lobbying is undertaken by the owners of sectorspecific capital in the different industries. They compete against each other by paying
campaign contributions to buy protection. From first principles, GH derive a set of predictions about the determinants of protection levels. The number of relevant variables in
1

See, e.g., Baldwin (1985), table 2.2 for 1973, and Baldwin and Magee (2000), for more recent congressional

votes such as on the Uruguay Round bills and NAFTA.
2

Henceforth referred to as the GH model.
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their optimal tariff equation is very small. In particular, no employment-related variables
appear. This is by design: Perfect labor mobility and the presence of a numeraire industry
free of policy influences make wages independent of trade protection. Thus a tariff changes
only the output prices and not the wages. There is always full employment since the numeraire sector absorbs any labor which might be set free in other industries. Furthermore,
excluding labor unions ensures that capital owners capture all created rents.
The objective of this paper is threefold: First, it shows that the equilibrium tariff of
the lobbying game in the GH model can be viewed as a weighted average of tariffs desired
by the various lobby groups and the welfare-maximizing tariff. This aggregation result is of
independent interest because it provides a useful link between the menu-auction approach
of lobbying in GH, where each lobby offers a menu of contributions for each possible trade
policy vector, and the common perception that lobby groups voice their trade policy wishes
and the government then aggregates these wishes and its own convictions of what is optimal
for the economy to determine the equilibrium tariff. Second, the paper shows that labor
market frictions, such as union activity and effective minimum wages, can be very naturally
incorporated into the protection for sale model. Labor market variables then enter the
equilibrium trade protection equation in an intuitive, but non-additive manner. My paper
thus provides a theoretical foundation for testing the protection for sale model for countries
with rigid labor markets, such as the continental European economies.3 Third, this paper
shows that the common wisdom that labor market rigidities always increase trade protection
may not be correct. In particular, union influence has ambiguous effects on the level of
trade distortions. Thus, it is possible that strong union influence may actually lower trade
protection.
The modelling of labor market imperfections in this paper is motivated by continental
European labor market characteristics since the major economies in this region, France and
Germany, are commonly considered prime examples of industrialized countries with rigid
labor markets. Table 1 gives an idea of the considerable differences in the organization
of labor markets within the industrialized world. The first line provides information on
the generosity of unemployment and welfare benefits. The numbers represent the average
of net income replacement rates over 60 months of unemployment for four family types
and two earning levels and include social assistance payments. Clearly, the two European
countries provide much more generous assistance to the unemployed than the United States.
3

The protection for sale model has been found to fit actual trade policy outcomes well; see, e.g., Goldberg

and Maggi (1999), Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000), Eicher and Osang (2002), and Matschke and
Sherlund (2006) for the United States, Mitra, Thomakos, and Ulubasoglu (2001) for Turkey, and McCalman
(2004) for Australia. An empirical estimation and test of the protection for sale model for continental
European countries has not yet been attempted, probably because such a test would have to deal with the
issue of substantial labor market rigidities in these countries.
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Table 1. Labor market characteristics (OECD 2004 and 2005)
Variable (in %)
income replacement in 2002
trade union density in 2000
bargaining coverage in 2000
unemployment rate in 2004
share long-term (> 1 year) unemployed in 2004

France Germany USA
72
10
90+
9.7
41.6

77
25
68
9.5
51.8

30
13
14
5.5
12.7

More generous unemployment benefits, at least in theory, reduce the willingness of workers
to accept a new job and increase unemployment. The second line shows that the trade
union density (i.e., the percentage of workers organized in unions) is substantially higher in
Germany than it is in the U.S. and France. In contrast, line 3 shows that more than two
thirds of employed workers are covered by collective bargaining in the European countries,
whereas collective bargaining coverage is far from extensive in the U.S. economy.4 The
emerging picture of considerable labor market differences becomes even starker when we
compare unemployment measures as labor market outcomes. Line 4 displays the overall
unemployment rate in the countries, and line 5 the share of long-term unemployed as a
percentage of all unemployed. In the U.S., both the unemployment rate and the long-term
unemployment rate are low, whereas for the European countries unemployment rates and
long-term unemployment shares are rather high, the latter topping 50% in Germany.
I show in this paper that different types of labor market rigidities lead to distinct
effects on trade policy that can be easily identified in the equilibrium trade protection
equation. Suppose wages are not market-clearing so that unemployment results, and assume
further that unemployed workers receive unemployment benefits. In this case, there are two
major reasons why the equilibrium tariff is higher than the one predicted by GH: First,
in order to increase overall employment, the government would set strictly positive import
tariffs even without lobbying. Second, unemployment benefits create a common interest for
lobbies to demand trade protection for all industries in order to reduce unemployment and,
consequently, unemployment tax payments. These two effects lead to a higher equilibrium
tariff. Results from the introduction of union lobbying and collective bargaining are also
very intuitive. Collective bargaining causes rent sharing between capital owners and workers
in an industry. If either group is not represented by a lobby, protection rents are lost for
lobbies and the resulting equilibrium tariff is lower than if all rents are captured by them.
Moreover, if collective bargaining agreements also cover non-union workers who are not
4The numbers for trade union density and bargaining coverage are very close: The reported U.S. bargain-

ing coverage number is probably overstated since the Bureau of Labor Statistics counts all union members
as covered by collective bargaining.
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represented by any lobby, some protection rents are always dissipated, thereby leading to a
lower equilibrium tariff.
The introduction of trade unions and minimum wages into the GH framework is
not completely novel to the literature. Rama and Tabellini (1998) consider a two-sector
model where in one sector, capital owners and trade union lobby the domestic government
simultaneously for trade protection and minimum wages. Their model, however, is clearly
tailored for developing countries and concentrates on investigating whether international
agencies such as the World Bank should target labor market or trade distortions when imposing rules for restructuring the economy. In Rama and Tabellini’s model, wages are fixed
by the state, so there is no role for the trade union in collective bargaining, and all workers
in the manufacturing sector are assumed to be trade union members. Moreover, there is
always full employment. In contrast, this paper considers an industrial country scenario
by making the following assumptions: (i) Industry-specific unions negotiate with firms over
wages and/or employment and also lobby for trade protection. (ii) Collective bargaining
results can cover non-union members. (iii) Binding minimum wages cause unemployment,
and as a consequence, unemployment assistance to unemployed workers creates additional
fiscal needs.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2, I set up the model.
In section 3, I derive a convenient way of expressing the equilibrium tariffs as a weighted
sum of tariffs that the players in the lobbying game would unilaterally set. This allows
me to interpret the effects of labor market regulations on the equilibrium tariff structure
as straightforward extensions of the effects on tariffs preferred by the different lobbying
game participants. I discuss these unilateral changes in section 3 and then aggregate these
effects in section 4 to see how equilibrium trade policy is affected. It is shown that trade
unionization, coverage of non-union workers by collective bargaining, and minimum wage
induced unemployment influence equilibrium tariff levels in the GH model. However, it is
not true that labor market rigidities necessarily increase trade protection. In particular, I
demonstrate the following: Binding minimum wages lead to higher tariffs, higher bargaining
coverage lowers tariff rates, and the effect of a higher degree of unionization is ambiguous.
Section 5 concludes.
2. Model Description
2.1. Basic setup. Consider a small country with n + 1 production sectors (henceforth
called industries) which faces an exogenous vector of world prices. The country owns a fixed
amount of labor L and fixed amounts of industry-specific capital Ki , where i = 1, . . . , n.
Each industry produces a single good, with good 0 being the numeraire.
On the consumption side, it is assumed that all individuals have identical quasilinear
preferences. The utility function for any individual is the sum of his good 0 consumption
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and strictly concave and increasing transformations of the consumption of each of the nonnumeraire goods 1 to n.5 Quasilinearity of preferences implies that the indirect utility
function of any individual is additively separable into an income and a price component.
Specifically, indirect utility can be written as the sum of income and consumer surplus Vi
from consumption of good i where i goes from 1 to n. While utility functions are identical
across agents, endowments are not. I divide the population into two groups: laborers and
capitalists. Laborers own 1 unit of labor each, while capital owners possess 1 unit of specific
capital per person which they supply inelastically.
Each non-numeraire industry i = 1, . . . , n consists of a unionized sector A and a nonunionized sector B which share an identical production function F i . In sector A of industry
i, wage wiA and/or employment are determined by union-firm negotiations, whereas in
sector B, wage wiB and employment are in principle determined by market forces, but I
leave open the possibility that the country introduces a binding minimum wage for the nonunionized sectors of the economy. Capital employed in the sectors of industry i, namely,
KiA in sector A and KiB = Ki − KiA in sector B, is immobile in the short run and is
thus industry- as well as sector-specific. Industries i = 1, . . . , n and their sectors use labor
and capital to produce output according to a linearly homogeneous and weakly concave
i < 0, F i
i
production function F i where FLL
KK < 0, and FKL > 0. The numeraire industry
(i = 0) only uses labor and is not divided into sectors. The world price of the numeraire
good is fixed at 1, and one unit of labor produces one unit of output F 0 with a one-to-one
production technology, which ties down the wage in the numeraire industry at one.
In the unionized sector A of industry i, wage wiA and possibly also employment is
determined by union-firm bargaining. For the general analysis, the mode of bargaining does
not have to be specified: An illustration with efficient union-firm bargaining can be found in
Matschke and Sherlund (2006). The negotiated union wage wiA has to be uniformly applied
to all employees in sector A, who can be union workers or non-union workers. In sector
A of industry i, αiU LiU workers are union members and αiN LN are non-union workers,
where LiU denotes the number of union members in industry i and LN the number of
non-union members. Thus, the number of workers employed in sector A of industry i is
LiA = αiU LiU + αiN LN .6 For the scope of the present analysis, it is not important to know
how exactly the employment shares are determined, as long as we acknowledge that they
will depend on the price of good i and thus on trade policy.
2.1.1. Case 1: Full employment. In this section, it is assumed that non-union labor is mobile
between industries, so that the wages in the non-unionized sectors of the economy will all
5It is assumed each individual has enough income to consume all goods; i.e., corner solutions are excluded.
6In the U.S., approximately 1.5% of non-union workers were covered by collective bargaining agreements

in 2001. In many European countries, however, union wages apply to a much higher percentage of non-union
workers as table 1 shows. Only in the case of a closed shop would αiN be equal to zero.

7

be equal to the wage in the numeraire industry 0, i.e. wiB = 1. Employment in the nonunionized sectors is then chosen by firms to maximize profits, which leads to the standard
rule that the marginal value product of labor should equal the wage, i.e., pi FLi (LiB ) = 1
for i = 1, ...., n. Of the labor force employed in sector B of industry i, there are βiU LiU
union workers and βiN LN non-union workers. Thus LiB = βiU LiU + βiN LN .7 As with the
employment shares in the unionized sector, we can keep the analysis general enough so as
not to worry about how exactly βiN and βiU are determined. It is reasonable, however, to
assume that these shares will depend on the price of good i.
It is important to realize that labor will always be fully employed since the numeraire
industry 0 acts like a sponge that absorbs any additional labor needed in other industries
without creating any changes in the non-union wage. At the same time, the numeraire
industry can also release labor needed in other industries without changes in wage. Therefore, without the existence of unions, labor issues would not matter for trade policy in this
setting because the competitive wage is independent of trade policy and there is always full
employment. However, since union wage and employment in the unionized part of industry
i usually do depend on the price of good i, the equilibrium trade policy will be influenced
by labor market considerations once we allow for union activity. This will be investigated
further after discussing case 2.
2.1.2. Case 2: Unemployment. A straightforward way to create unemployment in our model
is to introduce a minimum wage wB > 1 which lies above the world market price of the
numeraire good. This shuts down the numeraire industry at home and induces unemployment, so that in general the employment shares of the different worker categories do no
P
longer sum up to 1; i.e., αiU + βiU < 1 and ni=1 (αiN + βiN ) < 1. The workers who cannot
find employment receive a uniform unemployment benefit u which is financed via taxes.8
2.2. Lobbying and Trade Policy Determination. In some industries, but not the numeraire industry 0, either capital owners or the trade union or both are active lobbyists who
solicit trade protection from the domestic government. Each lobby offers the government a
schedule that lists its contributions as a function of the domestic price vector p. The price
vector p may differ from the world price vector p∗ if the domestic government imposes a
vector t of specific import or export tariffs or subsidies. Hence, if p∗i denotes the world
market price of good i, then the domestic price is pi = p∗i + ti . Suppose good i is an import
good. Then ti > 0 (ti < 0) means that an import tariff (subsidy) is imposed. By contrast,
7In the U.S., the β
iU shares of union workers not covered by collective bargaining are relatively small,

but not zero. Information obtained from the BLS indicated that in 2001, about 15% of union workers were
not covered by collective bargaining agreements.
8Considering a different financing scheme is very straightforward and thus left to the interested reader.
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if good i is an export good, then ti > 0 (ti < 0) implies an export subsidy (tax). To facilitate description, I henceforth focus on import goods when describing the determination
of the equilibrium trade policy. The reader should note, though, that with the information
given above, the interpretation of the trade policy outcome can readily accommodate export
goods as well. The tariff revenue (or the cost of subsidies) is rebated equally among (or
collected costlessly from) the population. The government maximizes the weighted sum of
total contributions and aggregate welfare where the weight on aggregate welfare is denoted
by a. Contributions C receive a weight of 1. The solution to the lobbying game follows
the findings in GH. The arising tariff structure is defined by the following set of conditions,
where the number of conditions equals the number of lobbies plus one: First, the equilibrium
tariff maximizes the government’s utility function. This must be true because the domestic
government chooses the tariff to maximize its own utility. Second, the equilibrium tariff
maximizes the sum of governmental utility and the utility of any lobby. To understand this
requirement, suppose this condition were not fulfilled for a certain lobby. Then, the lobby
could propose a different contribution schedule that left governmental welfare unchanged
and assigned the surplus payoff to itself. This would clearly be better for the lobby and
hence, the lobby could not have been utility-maximizing in the first place.
3. Group Interests and Tariff Determinants
3.1. General relationship between equilibrium tariff and lobby group interests. I
first show that the equilibrium tariff “in its structure”9 for any industry i = 1, . . . , n can be
expressed as the weighted sum of tariffs that the lobby groups and the government would set
unilaterally. This is a very useful result because it ties the equilibrium tariff vector directly
to the interests of the different players in the lobbying game. Henceforth, the percentage of
the population organized into lobby groups is denoted by
X
X
Θ=
θKi +
θUi ,
Ki ∈Ω

Ui ∈Ω

where Ω is the set of all organized lobby groups, consisting of trade unions and capital
owner groups. θKi (θUi ) stands for the population share of industry i capital owners (trade
unionists). The summation in the formula of Θ is over all capital owner and trade union
interest groups in all non-numeraire industries i = 1, . . . , n, provided that these groups have
formed a lobby. By definition, Θ only takes on values between 0 and 1.
9The GH model does not yield a closed-form solution for the equilibrium tariff t∗ . Instead, we obtain a
i

structural equation that depends implicitly on t∗i . The unilaterally optimal tariffs I derive for the different
groups of the lobbying game are similarly implicitly defined structural forms. When I say that the equilibrium
tariff “in its structure” is a weighted average of these tariffs, then I mean that t∗i is a weighted average of
the unilaterally optimal tariff forms which are themselves functions of t∗i .
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Because every lobby member is assumed to consume each good and receive a tariff
revenue share, I model tariff revenue and consumer surplus effects explicitly, while all other
effects that may influence the choice of the tariff are lumped together in an “other effects”
U
K
category (E). The symbol Ei j (Ei j ) denotes the other effects a tariff on industry i has for
the utility of group Kj (Uj ). These effects are discussed in detail in the next section. The
equilibrium tariff does not only reflect the interests of the lobby groups, but also the impact
G
on domestic welfare. Here, I denote by tG
i the welfare-maximizing tariff and by Ei the
other effects (apart from consumer surplus and tariff revenue considerations) that a tariff
has on domestic welfare. In the original (small economy) GH setup, the welfare-maximizing
G
i
tariff tG
i equals zero and Ei = F . However, with labor market distortions, this is not
10
0
i
G
necessarily the case. More precisely, tG
i = (F − Ei )/Mi , where
¸
n ·
X
jA dLjA
jB dLjB
G
i
0 dL0
Ei = F + FL
+
pj FL
+ pj F L
dpi
dpi
dpi
j=1

maximizes domestic welfare
n
n
n
n
X
X
X
X
WG =
tj Mj (pj ) +
pj F j (pj ) + (L +
Kj )
Vj (pj ).
j=1

j=0

j=1

j=1

Domestic welfare WG is the sum of tariff revenue, the value of domestic production, and
consumer surplus. Hence, by the definition of “other effects”, EiG equals the derivative of
the domestic production value with respect to the tariff. The following lemma proved in
the appendix links the tariffs the players would unilaterally set to the equilibrium tariff of
the lobbying game.
Lemma 3.1. The equilibrium tariff for industry i is given by
P
P
Uj ∗
Kj ∗
F i (t∗i )
aEiG (t∗i ) 1
1
Uj ∈Ω Ei (ti ) +
Kj ∈Ω Ei (ti )
∗
ti = 0 ∗ −
−
.
0
∗
0
Mi (ti )
a + Θ Mi (ti )
a+Θ
Mi (t∗i )
Alternatively, we can write the equilibrium tariff as an implicit solution to
X θKj Kj
X θUj Uj
a G ∗
t∗i =
ti (ti ) +
ti (t∗i ) +
t (t∗ ),
a+Θ
a+Θ
a+Θ i i
Kj ∈Ω

(3.1)

(3.2)

Uj ∈Ω
Kj

where tG
i is the welfare maximizing tariff on good i and ti
optimal tariff for lobby group Kj (Uj ).

U

(ti j ) denotes the unilaterally

Equation (3.1) shows that the interests of different lobby groups enter the optimal
tariff equation additively. Changes in the equilibrium tariff cannot be caused by simple income redistribution among lobbies; i.e., if the other effects for one lobby group are increased
and the other effects for a different lobby group are decreased by the same amount, then
10The L subscript stands for the partial derivative with respect to labor.
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by (3.1), t∗i does not change. It can also be seen that neither the total number of lobbies
nor the number of lobbies per industry affects the equilibrium tariff as long as the added
marginal benefits or costs of a tariff as represented by the other effects stay the same11.
Equation (3.2) is even more useful because it shows that the equilibrium tariff is
basically a weighted average of the unilaterally optimal tariffs for the different player groups
of the lobbying game.12 Hence, in order to get intuition about the effects of labor market
rigidities on the equilibrium tariff, it is sufficient to analyze how labor market rigidities
affect the interests of lobby groups and government. Readers familiar with the original GH
model will recognize that Lemma 3.1 is closely linked to the result established in Grossman
and Helpman (1994) that the optimal tariff maximizes a weighted social welfare function
and can thus be reinterpreted as the outcome of a political support function model with
endogenized welfare weights. Using (3.2), it is now possible to make meaningful statements
about how labor market rigidities affect the direction that lobbying takes; e.g., what does it
mean that a certain group lobbies for or against a certain tariff, given that in the subgameperfect Nash equilibrium all players ask for the same tariff vector? The answer to this
question lies in the tariffs the lobby groups would set unilaterally if they could do so.
3.2. Labor market rigidities and lobby group interests. To see how labor market
rigidities affect the lobby interests, I first discuss the effects of labor market rigidities on the
unilateral tariffs in order to better understand the equilibrium tariff outcome which will be
discussed in the next section.
3.2.1. Case 1: Full employment. I start with the welfare-maximizing tariff tG
i as the natural
benchmark, i.e., the tariff that would be set if no interest group influences were present.
Leaving out welfare components that are independent of the price of good i, tG
i maximizes
domestic welfare
n
X
i
0
WG = pi F + F + ti Mi + (L +
Kj )Vi ,
(3.3)
j=1

where pi F i is the value of domestic production in industry i, F 0 the value of domestic
P
production in industry 0, ti Mi the tariff revenue from imports of good i, and (L+ nj=1 Kj )Vi
the consumer surplus from consuming good i. The following result, as well as the other
propositions about unilaterally optimal tariffs henceforth, can be easily obtained by taking
the first-order condition of welfare maximization for a particular player by choice of ti and
then solving for ti . Therefore, their proofs are omitted.
11This assumes that the share of lobbies in the population is fixed.
12The reader should note, though, that the unilaterally optimal tariffs are all functions of t∗ , so the
i

relationship between the equilibrium tariff and the unilaterally optimal tariffs is not as simple as it might
appear. This is not surprising because GH also never obtain a closed form solution for the equilibrium tariff,
but only derive the solution as an implicit function of t∗i itself.
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Proposition 3.1. The tariff the government would set unilaterally is
tG
i =−

1
dLiA
(pi FLiA − 1)
.
0
Mi
dpi

(3.4)

where FLiA denotes the partial derivative of F iA with respect to labor.
This result is easily obtained, given that dLiA /dpi + dLiB /dpi + dL0 /dpi = 0 and
= FL0 = 1. An educated guess would be that an increase in the price of good i will
increase employment in the unionized sector, although this in general will depend upon the
exact bargaining structure. Such an increase alone, however, does not necessarily entail a
strictly positive tG
i . Only if the marginal value product of labor in sector A of industry
i exceeds the marginal value product 1 in the non-unionized sectors and industry 0 will
tG
i be positive. The intuition is simple: The government maximizes domestic welfare and
will use active trade policy in case that the overall production value can be increased by
reallocating labor across industries and sectors. Whether or not this is possible depends
on the specific assumptions about collective bargaining: For instance, if we assume efficient
bargaining (joint bargaining over wage and employment), the marginal value products of
labor will be the same in all sectors and industries and the domestic government will thus
have no incentive to use active trade policy.
Next, consider the interests of lobby groups gj , where gj ∈ {Uj , Kj } , j 6= i, outside
industry i. If gj could unilaterally set the tariff rate for industry i, it would do so to
maximize
n
X
Kj )Vi .
(3.5)
Wgj = θgj ti Mi + θgj (L +
pi FLiB

j=1

As before, all components that do not depend on ti are omitted. This leads to the following
result:
Proposition 3.2. The tariff lobby groups gj outside industry i would set unilaterally is
g

ti j =

Fi
,
Mi0

j 6= i.

(3.6)

As in the original GH model, other industries lobby for an import subsidy for industry
i as the negative consumer surplus effect from an increased tariff is stronger than the tariff
revenue effect.
Now I turn to the interests of industry i lobby groups, starting with the capital
owners. Contrary to the original GH model, the capital owners of sector A now have
to share their profits with workers. This will necessarily decrease their interest in trade
protection. If capital owners could set the tariff unilaterally, they would maximize
i

WKi = pi F − wiA LiA − LiB + θKi ti Mi + θKi (L +

n
X
j=1

Kj )Vi .

(3.7)
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Proposition 3.3. The tariff capital owners of industry i would set unilaterally is
·
¸
1
dwiA
Ki
i
iA dLiA
(1 − θKi )F − (wiA − pi FL )
ti = −
− LiA
.
θKi Mi0
dpi
dpi

(3.8)

Without union activity, an increase in the product price would increase firm profits
by
according to Hotelling’s Lemma. Also taking into account consumer surplus and tariff
revenue effects, the unilaterally optimal tariff for capital owners would be strictly positive
and equal to −(1 − θKi )/(θKi Mi0 )F i . However, due to union activity, workers will share in
the protection rents. In many cases, both the union wage and employment in the unionized
sector will rise when the price of product i increases. The increase in wage will necessarily
lower the capital owners’ unilaterally optimal tariff. Whether the increase in employment
will have a similar effect depends on whether workers in the unionized sector are paid
their marginal value product. For instance, under the assumptions of the right-to-manage
model where capital owners and union only bargain over wages and the firm then chooses
employment such that marginal value product of labor and union wage are equalized, the
i
increase in employment does not have an additional negative effect on tK
i , although the
wage effect is magnified. If workers are paid more than their marginal value product, which
would for example be the case with efficient bargaining, there will be a negative effect.
Finally, we also have to consider the unilaterally optimal tariff for union workers in
industry i. Assuming that the union maximizes the utility of its members, the unilaterally
i
optimal tariff tU
i maximizes
Fi

WUi = wiA αiU LiU + (1 − αiU )LiU + θUi ti Mi + θUi (L +

n
X

Kj )Vi .

(3.9)

j=1

Proposition 3.4. The tariff the trade union of industry i would set unilaterally is
¸
·
1
dαiU
dwiA
Ui
i
ti = −
+ (wiA − 1)
LiU .
(3.10)
−θUi F + αiU LiU
θUi Mi0
dpi
dpi
Without collective bargaining, union workers would have exactly the same interests
in trade policy as groups outside industry i; namely, as consumers, they would want an
import subsidy equal to F i /Mi0 . With bargaining, however, union workers participate in
protection rents via a higher union wage wiA and also possibly higher employment at wages
above their marginal value product, and therefore union workers may very well be interested
in a strictly positive tariff for their own industry.
In general, we cannot say whether the trade union and the capital owners of an
industry will agree on a positive import tariff. This is a consequence of the consumer
surplus and tariff revenue effects. If we exclude tariff revenue and consumer surplus effects
for industry i lobbyists as is often done in partial equilibrium studies, we would indeed find
that both lobbies want a tariff (Matsuyama 1990), provided that employment and wage
in the unionized sector rise. But if tariff revenue effects and consumer surplus effects are
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i
included, it is well possible that trade unions would lobby for protection (tU
i > 0) whereas
i
capital owners would lobby against it (tK
< 0) as in Baldwin and Magee (2000). This
i
outcome is especially likely if labor rents are substantially higher than capital rents (Katz
and Summers 1989).

3.2.2. Case 2: Unemployment. Once again I start with the welfare-maximizing tariff as the
natural benchmark. This tariff tG
i maximizes domestic welfare given by
WG = pi F i + ti Mi + (L +

n
X

Kj )Vi .

(3.11)

j=1

Proposition 3.5. The tariff the government would set unilaterally is
·
¸
iA
dLiB
1
iA dL
p
F
+
w
.
tG
=
−
i L
B
i
Mi0
dpi
dpi

(3.12)

As pi increases with the tariff, employment in industry i and thus overall employment
typically increases. This raises the production value and domestic welfare. The case for a
strictly positive tariff from the government’s perspective is thus more clear-cut than under
full employment,13 where a strictly positive tariff tG
i only results if the marginal value
product of labor differs between the unionized and non-unionized sectors of the economy.
Next let us look at the interests of lobby groups gj , where gj ∈ {Uj , Kj } , j 6= i,
outside industry i. If gj could set the tariff rate for industry i unilaterally, it would do so
to maximize
n
n
X
X
Wgj = θgj ti Mi + θgj (L +
Kj )Vi − θgj [L −
Lj ]u,
(3.13)
where θgj [L −

Pn

j=1 Lj ]u

j=1

j=1

is the tax paid by the lobby group for unemployment benefits.

Proposition 3.6. The tariff lobby groups gj outside industry i would set unilaterally is
·
¸
1
dLi
gj
i
ti = − 0 −F + u
, j 6= i.
(3.14)
Mi
dpi
With full employment, lobby groups outside industry i lobby for an import subsidy
on good i. With unemployment, the lobby group also takes into account that it will have to
pay less taxes when unemployment is lower, and therefore the desired import subsidy will
be lower or may even change to an import tariff.
If capital owners in industry i could set the tariff unilaterally, they would maximize
WKi = pi F i − wiA LiA − wB LiB + θKi ti Mi + θKi (L +

n
X
j=1

Kj )Vi − θKi [L −

n
X

Lj ]u. (3.15)

j=1

13The result that welfare is maximized by a strictly positive tariff when a binding minimum wage is in

place can also be found in Hill (1984).
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Proposition 3.7. The tariff capital owners of industry i would set unilaterally is
dLi dwiA
1
dLiA
i
tK
[(1 − θKi )F i − (wiA − pi FLiA )
+ θKi u
−
LiA ].
i =−
0
θKi Mi
dpi
dpi
dpi

(3.16)

Not surprisingly, the tax savings considerations now enter the tariff equation and
increase the unilaterally optimal tariff for capital owners compared to (3.8).
We still need to calculate the unilaterally optimal tariff for union workers in industry
i. Assuming that the union maximizes the utility of its members, the unilaterally optimal
i
tariff tU
i maximizes
WUi = wiA αiU LiU + wB βU LiU + (1 − αiU − βU )uLiU + θUi ti Mi +
θUi (L +
where βU =

Pn

n
X

Kj )Vi − θUi [L −

j=1

n
X

Lj ]u, (3.17)

j=1

i=1 βiU .

Proposition 3.8. The tariff the trade union of industry i would set unilaterally is
1
dwiA
dαiU
dβU
[−θUi F i + αiU LiU
+ (wiA − u)
LiU + (wB − u)
LiU
0
θUi Mi
dpi
dpi
dpi
dLi
]. (3.18)
+ θUi u
dpi
The reduced tax payment used for unemployment compensation increases the tariff
desired by the union. In addition, increases in employment in sectors A and B of industry
i are now both valued (the weight being the difference between the wage paid in this
sector and the unemployment benefit), whereas in the full-employment case, an increase
in sector B employment for union workers (and the corresponding reduction in industry 0
i
employment) did not lead to an additional tariff-raising component in tU
i because wages in
the non-unionized sectors and industry 0 were equal.
i
tU
i =−

4. Equilibrium Tariff Structure
Using Lemma 3.1 and the unilaterally optimal tariffs for the different player groups,
the optimal tariff of the lobbying game can be easily determined. As before, let Θ be defined
as the percentage of the population that is represented by lobbies.
Proposition 4.1. Consider the full employment case. Let tG
i be defined as in (3.4). The
∗
equilibrium tariff ti in industry i can be characterized as follows depending on who lobbies:
(a) If both labor and capital in i lobby, then
t∗i =

1
dLiA
a G ∗
t (t ) −
[(1 − Θ)F i − (wiA − pi FLiA )
a+Θ i i
(a + Θ)Mi0
dpi
dαiU
dwiA
+ (wiA − 1)
LiU − (LiA − αiU LiU )
].
dpi
dpi
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(b) If nobody in i lobbies, then
t∗i =

a G ∗
Θ
ti (ti ) +
F i.
a+Θ
(a + Θ)Mi0

(c) If only the trade union in i lobbies, then
t∗i =

a G ∗
1
dwiA
dαiU
ti (ti ) −
[−ΘF i + (wiA − 1)
LiU + αiU LiU
].
0
a+Θ
(a + Θ)Mi
dpi
dpi

(d) Finally, if only capital owners in i lobby, then
t∗i =

a G ∗
1
dLiA
dwiA
ti (ti ) −
[(1 − Θ)F i − (wiA − pi FLiA )
− LiA
].
0
a+Θ
(a + Θ)Mi
dpi
dpi

In a world without lobbies and without trade union activity, the equilibrium tariff
would be equal to the tariff that maximizes domestic welfare. In fact, without labor market
rigidities and lobby influence, the welfare-maximizing tariff (and thus the equilibrium tariff)
is zero, which reflects standard theory that a small open economy should abstain from active
trade policy. When capital owner lobbying is considered, the equilibrium tariff becomes
positive or negative depending on whether or not capital owners in the industry under
consideration lobby. The equilibrium tariff in this basic GH setup without labor market
rigidities is completely independent of any labor market variables. Once we allow for trade
union activity, this result changes considerably. Assuming that both the union wage and
overall and union employment in the unionized sector of industry i are increasing in pi , the
exact results now depend not only on whether or not capital owners of industry i lobby,
but they also depend on the lobbying behavior of the trade union in industry i. Compared
to the case without trade union activity, capital owners are less interested in a tariff for
their industry because they have to share protection rents to the extent that union wages
increase and more workers are employed at wages above the marginal value product of labor.
Union workers, on the other hand, are interested in higher trade protection to the extent
that their employment in the unionized sector at wages above the ones in the competitive
sector rises and the union wage increases. When both union and capital owners of an
industry lobby, these effects partly, but not completely offset each other. The main reason
why these effects do not completely outbalance each other lies in the fact that some nonunion workers are covered by collective bargaining agreements. For continental European
countries such as Germany and France, where collective bargaining coverage of non-union
workers is substantial, the predicted equilibrium tariff would thus be considerably different
from the equilibrium tariff predicted by the basic GH model.
Let us now consider the case of an effective minimum wage that applies to all the
non-unionized sectors of the economy.
Proposition 4.2. Consider the unemployment case. Let tG
i be defined as in (3.12). The
equilibrium tariff t∗i in industry i can be characterized as follows depending on who lobbies:
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(a) If both labor and capital in i lobby, then
t∗i =

1
dLiA
dαiU
a G ∗
dLi
t (t )−
−(wiA −pi FLiA )
+(wiA −u)
LiU
[(1−Θ)F i +Θu
a+Θ i i
(a + Θ)Mi0
dpi
dpi
dpi
dβU
dwiA
+ (wB − u)
LiU − (LiA − αiU LiU )
].
dpi
dpi
(b) If nobody in i lobbies, then
t∗i =

a G ∗
Θ
dLi
ti (ti ) +
(F i − u
).
0
a+Θ
(a + Θ)Mi
dpi

(c) If only the trade union in i lobbies, then
t∗i =

1
dLi
dαiU
a G ∗
t (t ) −
[−ΘF i + Θu
+ (wiA − u)
LiU
a+Θ i i
(a + Θ)Mi0
dpi
dpi
dβU
dwiA
+ (wB − u)
LiU + αiU LiU
].
dpi
dpi
(d) Finally, if only capital owners in i lobby, then

t∗i =

a G ∗
1
dLi
dLiA
dwiA
ti (ti ) −
[(1 − Θ)F i + Θu
− (wiA − pi FLiA )
− LiA
].
0
a+Θ
(a + Θ)Mi
dpi
dpi
dpi

Most of the results of the full employment case still apply. One major change occurs
because the binding minimum wage and the unemployment caused by it lead to a strictly
positive welfare-maximizing tariff which depends on the price elasticity of employment.
Moreover, the minimum wage in the otherwise competitive sectors of the economy also has
an impact on the interests of the various lobby groups. Regardless of who lobbies, all lobbies
are in favor of a higher tariff because it reduces unemployment and thus the resulting tax
burden. In addition, the union is interested in a higher tariff because higher employment of
otherwise unemployed union workers in the non-unionized sector leads to increased union
worker income. In contrast, firms in sector B of industry i still hire workers until the
marginal value product of labor equals wage, hence the increase in sector B employment
does not constitute an additional reason for capital owners to lower their desired tariff.
In summary, labor market rigidities lead to additional components in the equilibrium
tariff equation compared to the basic protection for sale framework. Binding minimum
wages introduce an additional, tariff-raising component, whereas collective bargaining in
parts of the economy can either lead to a positive or negative additional component in the
equilibrium tariff equation, depending on who in an industry is lobbying. Labor market
variables, such as employment and wage elasticities, unionization and collective bargaining
coverage rates, influence the equilibrium trade policy in an intuitive way, but they do so in
a non-additive manner.
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5. Conclusion
In this paper, I show that augmenting the GH model by trade union activity and a
binding minimum wage introduces labor market variables into the equilibrium tariff equation
in a natural manner. In particular, it is shown that contrary to the basic GH model,
industry- and sector-specific employment and wage elasticities do matter for trade policy.
Therefore, any empirical study that wants to estimate and test the GH model for an economy
with considerable labor market rigidities either needs such elasticity estimates or has to
impose additional structure on the model in order to replace these elasticities by wage and
employment data.14
One might expect that higher labor market distortions, commonly assumed to be
a distinguishing feature between the United States and the continental European labor
market, increase trade protection. In this paper, however, I show that this expectation is
only partly supported by theory. Binding minimum wages increase the equilibrium tariff
level, since tariffs can be used not only to shift employment to the protected industry, but
also to increase overall employment. Since the resulting increase in production is beneficial
for the domestic country, the government (even without lobbying) would levy a strictly
positive tariff on imports and subsidize exports. Moreover, higher employment lowers taxes
necessary to finance unemployment benefits. Tax reduction considerations create some
common interest between lobbies to increase employment in industries other than their
own.
The effect of trade union activity depends on who takes part in the lobbying game.
Suppose first that the trade union, but not capital owners of an industry lobby. The
trade union captures part of the protection rents from the firms via collective bargaining.
Moreover, these protectionist interests are represented in the lobbying game. Compared to
the case when trade unions and capital owners of industry i do not lobby, the equilibrium
tariff in this industry thus increases. The opposite is true, however, when capital owners
lobby but the trade union does not. Since part of the protection benefits goes to workers via
collective bargaining, the capital owners’ interest in protection (and thus the equilibrium
tariff) is reduced as compared to a model where no profit sharing between capital owners
and workers occurs. A similar result holds if both the trade union and capital owners of
industry i lobby. In this case, capital owners and workers share the rents accruing from
trade protection. In conclusion, under the assumption that not all unions or all capital
owner groups participate in lobbying for trade policy, economic theory does not provide
any clear-cut predictions that the existence of trade unions leads to higher trade protection,
so any attempts to empirically test such a prediction would be ill-advised.

14The latter approach is employed in Matschke and Sherlund (2006) for the U.S. economy.
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In contrast, the coverage of non-union workers by collective bargaining outcomes,
which is substantial in many European countries, lowers equilibrium trade protection if the
capital bound in the unionized sector is constant. This result stems from the fact that the
coverage of non-union workers dissipates part of the protection rents to workers who are
not represented by lobbies.
In conclusion, this paper presents a very general theoretical framework to test the
increasingly popular protection for sale model for economies with labor market rigidities.
A practical test implementation will require information not only on who lobbies and on
import demand elasticities, but also on wage and employment elasticities by industry and
sector. Carrying out such an empirical test is beyond the scope of this paper and is left for
future research.
Appendix A. Proofs
Proof of Lemma 3.1. Let gj ∈ {Uj , Kj } denote a lobby group in industry j. From
Grossman and Helpman (1994), we know that the equilibrium tariff for any industry i
fulfills the following conditions: (i) It maximizes the governmental welfare function


n
n
n
n
X
X
X
X
X
tj Mj (pj ) +
pj F j + (L +
Kj )
Vj (pj ) .
Cgj + a 
j=1

gj ∈Ω

j=0

j=1

j=1

This implies the FOC (after multiplying by (` − 1), where ` is the number of lobbies)
X ∂Cgj
0
(` − 1)
+ (` − 1) aEiG − (` − 1) aF i + (` − 1) ati Mi = 0,
(A.1)
∂pi
gj ∈Ω

where EiG denotes the sum of changes in the value of domestic production caused by a tariff
on good i. (ii) For all gk ∈ Ω, the equilibrium tariff also maximizes the sum of lobby gk ’s
and the government’s welfare


n
n
n
n
X
X
X
X
X
tj Mj (pj ) +
pj F j + (L +
Kj )
Vj (pj ) + Wgk ,
C gj + a 
gj ∈Ω,gj 6=gk

j=1

j=0

j=1

j=1

where Wgk denotes lobby gk ’s welfare before the contribution is subtracted. This implies
the FOC
X
∂Cgj
0
= − (a + θgk ) ti Mi + (a + θgk ) F i − aEiG − Eigk .
∂pi
gj ∈Ω,gj 6=gk

Summing over the gk , we obtain
X ∂Cgj
X
X
X gj
0
(` − 1)
= −(`a +
θgj )ti Mi + (`a +
θgj )F i − `aEiG −
Ei .
∂pi
gj ∈Ω

gj ∈Ω

gj ∈Ω

t∗i

(A.2)

gj ∈Ω

Substituting (A.2) into (A.1) and solving for
yields (3.1). To verify (3.2), note that
the unilateral tariff that lobby gj would want to impose on industry i is determined by
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0

g

g

g

θgj ti Mi − θgj F i + Ei j = 0, which yields ti j = [F i − Ei j /θgj ]/Mi0 . The structural form of
g
g
Ei j is the same as in the previous equation, except that it is here a function of ti j instead
g
g
of t∗i . It is possible to substitute from this equation for Ei j if we keep in mind that then ti j
will be a function of the equilibrium tariff t∗i and as such, in general, does no longer solve
the original maximization problem of population group gj . The desired result follows. ¤
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